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NOTE

THE IMPACT OF AMEX AND ITS PROGENY ON
TECHNOLOGY PLATFORMS
Kacyn H. Fujii*
Big Tech today faces unprecedented levels of antitrust scrutiny. Yet antitrust
enforcement against Big Tech still faces a major obstacle: the Supreme Court’s
2018 decision in Ohio v. American Express. Popularly called Amex, the case
imposed a higher initial burden on antitrust plaintiffs in cases involving twosided markets. Two-sided markets connect two distinct, noncompeting groups
of customers on a shared platform. These platforms have indirect network effects, meaning that one group of customers benefits when more of the second
group of customers joins the platform. Two-sided markets are ubiquitous in
the technology sector, encompassing social media, search engines, and online
marketplaces.
Many have observed that the Amex Court’s reasoning drew on questionable
economic principles, contrary to the typical approach in antitrust law. This
Note examines and adds to these critiques through a novel analysis of lowercourt cases post-Amex. This analysis reveals that Amex has resulted in inconsistencies and confusion in the lower courts, opening the door for technology
defendants to manipulate Amex’s definition of two-sided markets for their
own benefit. To resolve these inconsistencies, this Note proposes a two-part legislative solution to curb Amex’s reach.
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INTRODUCTION
After years of growing concern about Big Tech’s influence over our markets, data, and society more generally, in July 2020 the House Judiciary Committee’s antitrust subcommittee held an unprecedented hearing that brought
the leaders of Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Google to Washington. 1 At the
hearing, members on both sides of the aisle expressed concern over Big Tech’s
power, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. 2 By September, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had begun investigating Amazon and gearing
up to file a possible antitrust suit against Facebook. 3 In October, the Senate

1. Roger McNamee, A Historic Antitrust Hearing in Congress Has Put Big Tech on Notice, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2020, 7:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020
/jul/31/big-tech-house-historic-antitrust-hearing-times-have-changed [perma.cc/6TCR-YNL2].
2. Taylor Hatmaker, Lawmakers Argue That Big Tech Stands to Benefit from the Pandemic and Must Be Regulated, TECHCRUNCH (July 29, 2020, 1:36 PM), https://techcrunch
.com/2020/07/29/big-tech-cicilline-pandemic-antitrust-hearing [perma.cc/BZJ5-2SAC]; Lauren Feiner, Tech Competitors Are ‘Blown Away’ by Congress’ CEO Grilling and Hopeful for Antitrust Reform, CNBC (July 31, 2020, 10:27 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/31/big-techcompetitors-were-blown-away-by-house-antitrust-ceo-hearing.html [perma.cc/R8JU-VJVH].
3. Tyler Sonnemaker, Amazon Is Reportedly Facing a New Antitrust Investigation into
Its Online Marketplace Led by the FTC and Attorneys General in New York and California,
INSIDER (Aug. 3, 2020, 3:53 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-antitrust-probe-ftcnew-york-california-online-marketplace-2020-8 [perma.cc/GW5Q-7DGQ]; Brent Kendall,
John D. McKinnon & Ryan Tracy, FTC Preparing Possible Antitrust Suit Against Facebook,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2020, 7:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-preparing-possible-antitrust-suit-against-facebook-11600211840 [perma.cc/SS86-DXX9].
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Commerce Committee unanimously voted to subpoena the CEOs of Facebook, Google, and Twitter. 4 Only days later, the House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee released a landmark report that concluded a sixteen-month
investigation into Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Apple. 5 This report broke
new ground by declaring that Google and Facebook had monopoly power and
by indicating Congress’s support for major antitrust legislation for the first
time in decades. 6 The report also signaled that Congress would support
stronger antitrust enforcement by federal and state enforcers. 7 The Department of Justice, the FTC, and multiple state attorneys general subsequently
brought lawsuits against Google and Facebook for anticompetitive behavior. 8
Amid these lawsuits, Congress has continued to press forward with legislation
that would make sweeping changes to antitrust law, such as a bill proposed by
Senator Klobuchar in February 2021. 9
Technology companies 10 have never faced this level of scrutiny, but existing antitrust law has limited power over Big Tech companies. Courts interpret
the Sherman Act using the consumer welfare standard, which relies on economic measures like price to determine violations of antitrust law. 11 Typically,
monopolies raise prices, which directly harms consumers. Technology companies are unique in that they offer their products for free or for very low
prices making it difficult to demonstrate harm to consumers. 12

4. Brian Fung, Senate Commerce Votes to Issue Subpoenas to CEOs of Facebook, Google
and Twitter, CNN BUS. (Oct. 1, 2020, 11:39 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/01/tech/facebook-google-senate-subpoena/index.html [perma.cc/P7AM-ATHV].
5. Ryan Tracy, House Panel Says Big Tech Wields Monopoly Power, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6,
2020, 8:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-panel-calls-for-congress-to-break-uptech-giants-11602016985 [perma.cc/BVH2-7AWT].
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Sues Monopolist Google for Violating Antitrust Laws (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-suesmonopolist-google-violating-antitrust-laws [perma.cc/79RE-9252]; David McCabe, Google Denies Antitrust Claims in Early Response to U.S. Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/21/technology/google-antitrust-lawsuit.html [perma.cc/L6HF-MZLQ].
9. Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, S. 225, 117th Cong.
(2021); see Matthew F. Tilley & David B. Hamilton, Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement
Act Proposes Wholesale Changes to U.S. Antitrust Law, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (Feb. 15,
2021), https://www.womblebonddickinson.com/us/insights/alerts/competition-and-antirustlaw-enforcement-act-proposes-wholesale-changes [perma.cc/86H6-NPBB].
10. The terms “Big Tech” and “technology companies” are used interchangeably in this Note.
11. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 107–08 (1984) (“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription. . . . Restrictions on price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade
that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.” (cleaned up) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979))); Tim Wu, Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law, 82
ANTITRUST L.J. 771, 793–94 (2019).
12. See, e.g., Alec Stapp, Opinion, Congress Made a Lousy Case for Breaking Up Big Tech,
MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/09/1009999/congress-antitrust-report-big-tech-policy-opinion [perma.cc/D6R4-882Q]; Ryan Bourne, Opinion,
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A 2018 Supreme Court opinion presents another major obstacle to enforcing antitrust laws against technology companies. 13 Ohio v. American Express Company (Amex) created a framework for regulating two-sided markets
(interchangeably referred to as two-sided platforms) under antitrust law. 14 In
a two-sided market, two distinct customer groups create benefits for each
other through their shared interest in a particular product or service. For example, platforms like Uber rely on demand from each side of the market—
drivers and riders—to succeed. Two-sided platforms are ubiquitous in the
technology sector and the economy in general; prominent examples include
credit- and payment-card systems, search engines, online marketplaces, social
media, newspapers, airline- and restaurant-reservation systems, and ridesharing services. 15 Under Amex, antitrust plaintiffs bear the additional burden of
showing net anticompetitive harm on both sides of a two-sided market. 16 In
addition, Amex’s broad definition of two-sided markets may shield many Big
Tech companies from antitrust liability. 17
Many scholars have speculated about how Amex will affect Big Tech and
antitrust law in general. 18 While scholars have critiqued Amex and analyzed
some post-Amex cases, 19 this Note is the first to examine Amex’s impact on
Big Tech by pulling together several recent lower-court decisions. It also offers
Big Tech Antitrust Probe: Where’s the Real Harm from Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple?,
MARKETWATCH (July 24, 2019, 11:07 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/wheres-thereal-harm-from-google-amazon-facebook-and-apple-2019-06-18
[perma.cc/5RTU-M3XF].
The consumer welfare standard, which measures harm to consumers through economic
measures like price, cannot easily account for Big Tech companies’ anticompetitive behavior
since they keep prices low or at zero. See Bourne, supra. As a result, one of the biggest debates in
antitrust law today is whether the consumer welfare standard should be reformed. See, e.g., Lina
M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017). Given how entrenched
the Chicago School and consumer welfare standard are in the courts, Congress has begun to
consider legislative solutions to the problem. See Emily Birnbaum, Amy Klobuchar’s New Legislation Should Scare Big Tech, PROTOCOL (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.protocol.com/amyklobuchar-big-tech-antitrust [perma.cc/4MDG-4G25].
13. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Sides with American Express on Merchant Fees, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/06/25/us/politics/supreme-court-americanexpress-fees.html [perma.cc/PL89-W73M].
14. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285–87 (2018).
15. Daniel Francis & Jay Ezrielev, Disaggregating Market Definition: AmEx and a Plural
View of Market Definition, 98 NEB. L. REV. 460, 463 (2019).
16. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2287–90.
17. Liptak, supra note 13.
18. See, e.g., Tim Wu, The American Express Opinion, the Rule of Reason, and Tech Platforms, 7 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 117 (2019); Ben Bloodstein, Note, Amazon and Platform Antitrust,
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 187 (2019).
19. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, The Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical Most-FavoredNation Restraints and the Error of Amex, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 93; Anthony W. Swisher &
Jody Boudreault, DOJ Moves to Vacate Its Loss in U.S. v. Sabre, Apparently over Fears It May
Burden Merger Enforcement, WASH. LEGAL FOUND.: LEGAL PULSE (May 26, 2020),
https://www.wlf.org/2020/05/26/wlf-legal-pulse/doj-moves-to-vacate-its-loss-in-u-s-v-sabreapparently-over-fears-it-may-increase-the-burden-of-proving-anticompetitive-mergers
[perma.cc/2D53-EXZN].
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a novel legislative compromise that would limit Amex’s reach without overturning it outright. In doing so, this Note provides a politically divided Congress with another option to consider as they debate changing the antitrust
laws. Part I overviews the evolution of antitrust law and explains how Amex
has modified antitrust analysis for two-sided markets. Part II analyzes recent
lower-court cases to illustrate Amex’s inconsistencies and demonstrate how
Amex makes it even harder to rein in Big Tech. Part III responds by proposing
legislation to limit Amex’s holding to a narrow set of two-sided markets that
can be adjusted to meet new antitrust challenges.
I.

AMEX AND TWO-SIDED MARKETS

Given its potential impact on the technology sector, Amex has been called
the most consequential antitrust decision of the decade. 20 This Part presents
background on the purpose and development of antitrust law prior to the
Amex decision. Section I.A describes the evolution of antitrust law. Section I.B
introduces current modes of antitrust analysis. Section I.C explains how Amex
modified antitrust analysis for two-sided markets.
A. The Evolution of Antitrust Law
Antitrust law is governed primarily by the Sherman Act, which was
passed in 1890 to promote fair competition in the economy. 21 The Sherman
Act’s broad language allowed courts to play a large role in its interpretation,
effectively making it a common law statute. 22 Thus the Sherman Act’s application has varied in accordance with changing public values and goals surrounding antitrust enforcement since its enactment.
The framers of the Sherman Act were concerned with a small number of
firms having too much power. 23 They also wanted to make sure that firms
played fairly so that small businesses would have the chance to compete. 24 To
achieve these goals, courts first relied on structuralism, the idea that certain
market structures can impede competition. 25 For example, when there are

20. See, e.g., Natasha Sarin, What’s in Your Wallet (and What Should the Law Do About
It?), 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 553 (2020); Lina Khan, The Supreme Court Just Quietly Gutted Antitrust Law, VOX (July 3, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/7/3/17530320
/antitrust-american-express-amazon-uber-tech-monopoly-monopsony [perma.cc/6FK7-WLHF].
21. See Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–
7); see also The Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guideantitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [perma.cc/BPY8-HLV8] (“Congress passed the first antitrust law,
the Sherman Act, in 1890 as a ‘comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving
free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.’ ”).
22. Michael L. Katz & A. Douglas Melamed, Competition Law as Common Law: American Express and the Evolution of Antitrust, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2062 (2020).
23. Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—Retrospective and Prospective:
Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 944 (1987).
24. Id.
25. Khan, supra note 12, at 718.
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fewer firms in a market, it is easier for them to collude and engage in oligopolistic behavior like price fixing. 26 Until the 1960s, courts blocked mergers that
they determined would result in too much market concentration. 27
In the 1970s, however, the Supreme Court replaced structuralism with the
“consumer welfare” standard propounded by the Chicago School of economics and antitrust. 28 The Chicago School defines consumer welfare as allocative
efficiency across both consumers and producers. 29 Under this standard, behavior that results in efficiency gains to either consumers or producers should
be upheld under antitrust law. 30 This is based on the belief that firms will try
to maximize profits and efficiency, which ultimately helps consumers through
lower prices and better products. 31 In other words, even if there is no direct
benefit to consumers, the Chicago School subscribes to the view that greater
efficiencies for companies will eventually help consumers.
The consumer welfare standard focuses on empirical harm to the market
as measured by economic indicators, especially price. 32 Given this focus on
economics, plaintiffs must also show actual anticompetitive harm instead of
merely showing that the market structure typically leads to anticompetitive
behavior. 33 Under the Chicago School standard, it is not enough to show that
Google, for example, has monopoly power—plaintiffs must demonstrate that
Google’s specific behavior resulted in anticompetitive harm to the market.
Moreover, vertical agreements (agreements between firms at different levels
of the production chain, like manufacturers and retailers) receive less scrutiny
than horizontal agreements (agreements between competitors) under the Chicago School approach. 34 This shift from structuralism to the Chicago School

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 718–20.
29. Reza Dibadj, Reactionary Reform and Fundamental Error, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 281,
296–97 (2012).
30. See Khan, supra note 12, at 720 n.38.
31. Id. at 719; Dibadj, supra note 29, at 297; Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of
Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 480 (2012)
(“The Sherman Act seeks to maintain a marketplace free of anticompetitive practices . . . . The
law assumes that such a marketplace . . . will tend to bring about the lower prices, better products, and more efficient production processes that consumers typically desire.” (quoting Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 909 (2007))).
32. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time
to Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 147, 148 (2012) (“The Chicago School of Antitrust influenced the law and policy in large part because its application of price theory and economics produced empirical studies to support an inference that Chicago School-based explanations of
a given practice were more plausible than alternative, usually anticompetitive, explanations.”).
33. See Khan, supra note 12, at 717–19, 721.
34. See Vincent Verouden, Vertical Agreements: Motivation and Impact, in 3 ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST L., ISSUES COMPETITION LAW & POLICY 1813, 1814–16 (Wayne Dale
Collins ed., 2008).
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approach has thus led to lax antitrust enforcement and a greater reliance on
economics in antitrust law. 35
B. Antitrust Modes of Analysis
The first section of the Sherman Act reads: “Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 36 Initially, the Supreme Court read this to prohibit all restraints of trade,
defined as any activity that limited competition. However, all kinds of activities limit competition, such as agreements between small businesses to not
compete with each other or to share information on employee salaries. Only
one year after United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, the Court
began to recognize that some restraints of trade were reasonable, 37 giving rise
to the “rule of reason.” 38
Yet the Court maintained that some restraints were so nakedly anticompetitive that a reasonableness inquiry would be unnecessary. 39 In United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Co., the Court said, “a combination formed for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, [or] fixing . . . price[s] . . . is illegal
per se.”40 This language marked the beginning of “per se” antitrust analysis.
Today, courts still apply either per se or rule of reason analysis to determine whether the Sherman Act has been violated. 41 In most cases, courts apply
rule of reason analysis, in which courts must assess the economic impact of
the allegedly anticompetitive behavior. 42 First, courts must define the “relevant market,” which provides the frame of reference for judging anticompetitive harm. 43 Market definition, which requires parties and courts to conduct
fact-intensive economic analysis, often has an outsized impact on antitrust

35. Letter from Herbert Hovenkamp, Prof., Univ. of Pa. Sch. of L., to Chairman David N.
Cicilline and Ranking Member F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com., &
Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 2 (Apr. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Hovenkamp Letter],
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/submission_from_herbert_hovenkamp.pdf
[perma.cc/KQ8E-9UPL].
36. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
37. 166 U.S. 290 (1897); see United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); see
also Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antitextualism, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1205, 1217 (2021)
(“The year after rejecting the rule of reason under section 1 in Trans-Missouri, Justice Peckham
wrote again for the Court . . . this time appearing to apply a form of the rule of reason . . . .”).
38. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
39. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
40. Id. at 223.
41. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
42. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018); Standard Oil, 221
U.S. 1.
43. See Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 31, 31–32 (2014).
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analysis. 44 For example, even if Zingerman’s Deli has a large market share
among delis in Ann Arbor, Michigan, it would not look like a monopolist if
the relevant market is defined as every restaurant in the United States. Courts
may only assess anticompetitive harm to competitors within that relevant
market; indeed, it would make little sense to treat a shave ice shop in Hawaiʻi
and a deli in Michigan as competitors.
Once the relevant market is defined, rule of reason analysis involves a
“three-step, burden-shifting framework.”45 First, the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that the restraint has a “substantial anticompetitive effect that
harms consumers in the relevant market.” 46 If the plaintiff succeeds, the defendant then bears the burden of demonstrating that the restraint has a procompetitive effect, meaning any favorable effect on the market. 47 If the
defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must prove either that the anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive effects or that the procompetitive
effects could be “reasonably achieved” in a less anticompetitive manner. 48
In contrast, per se analysis avoids market definition or fact-intensive inquiries into economic harm. 49 Because of the Chicago School’s influence, per
se analysis is relegated to a narrow category of cases where the restraint is
“manifestly anticompetitive,” 50 as with price-fixing. 51 For example, an agreement by San Francisco restaurants to fix prices of avocado toast at the same
rate would be per se illegal, even without an inquiry into the relevant market.

44. See Robert A. Rogowsky & William F. Shughart II, Market Definition in Antitrust
Analysis: Comment 2 (FTC Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 77, 1982), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/reports/market-definition-antitrust-analysis-comment/wp077.pdf
[perma.cc/8K8G-8AAA].
45. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2284.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or
unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed . . . .”).
50. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (“We have said that
per se rules are appropriate only for ‘conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive,’ that is, conduct
‘that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.’ ” (cleaned
up)); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) (“[I]n characterizing this conduct under the per se rule, our inquiry must focus on whether the effect
and . . . the purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly
free-market economy . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
51. In general, price fixing is per se illegal under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). But see, e.g., Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 7 (holding that BMI and ASCAP’s blanket licenses were not per se illegal because of their procompetitive
benefits).
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C. The Amex Formulation
Within rule of reason analysis, Amex carved out a separate rule for twosided platforms, which are “business[es] that depend[] on relationships between two different, noncompeting groups of transaction partners.” 52 American Express (Amex) is a two-sided market because it operates a credit card
transaction platform that connects merchants and customers. In Amex, the
DOJ and several state attorneys general alleged that the “no-steering” clauses
in Amex’s contracts with its partner merchants were anticompetitive. 53 These
clauses said that merchants could not “steer,” or encourage, customers to use
other credit cards despite Amex’s higher merchant fees. 54 The plaintiffs
claimed that these provisions harmed competition since they restricted what
merchants could do to offset or avoid Amex’s higher fees. 55 Since merchants
were not allowed to give discounts for competitor credit cards such as Visa or
Discover, customers had less of a price incentive to select these cards over
Amex. Amex countered that its no-steering provisions and higher merchant
fees were procompetitive because they allowed Amex to give large rewards to
its cardholders on the other side of the two-sided market. 56
Though the district court found that the no-steering provisions resulted
in anticompetitive harm, 57 the Second Circuit reversed, claiming that the
plaintiffs did not adequately prove anticompetitive harm. 58 The Supreme
Court agreed with the Second Circuit, holding that the plaintiffs did not meet
their burden of showing that Amex’s higher merchant fees and no-steering
clause had anticompetitive effects. 59
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas explained that two-sided markets must be treated differently than other markets. 60 Two-sided markets,
which bring together two different customer groups, are characterized by indirect network effects between the two sides of the platform. 61 This means that
each group benefits when a customer joins on the other side. 62 Credit card

52. Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case,
2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 37.
53. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2283.
54. Id. at 2280.
55. See id. at 2277.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 2283.
58. See id. at 2277.
59. Id. at 2290.
60. Id. at 2285–86.
61. Id. at 2280.
62. Id.
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networks, for example, connect merchants and customers and are more valuable to merchants when more customers join the network. 63 Likewise, customers benefit when more merchants accept their credit card. 64 The majority
held that because both sides of the platform are interdependent, courts need
to consider both sides of a two-sided market when conducting rule of reason
analysis. 65 In other words, the plaintiffs had to show that both cardholders and
merchants were harmed by the no-steering provisions.
Next, the majority laid out some exceptions to this rule for two-sided markets. It noted that indirect network effects might be so negligible that only one
side must be taken into account in rule of reason analysis. 66 Newspapers,
which connect readers and advertisers, are the quintessential example of a
platform with weak indirect network effects. 67 Although advertisers benefit
from more people reading the newspaper, readers are indifferent as to how
many advertisers the newspaper has. 68 Because of weak indirect network effects, cases like this require analysis of only one side of the market.
The Court further limited the two-sided market rule to platforms that “facilitate a single, simultaneous transaction between participants.” 69 It viewed
the credit card market as a single two-sided market “ ‘suppl[ying] only one
product’—transactions.” 70 For two-sided transaction markets like credit card
networks, courts can consider the net effect of the restraint on this single market of transactions. 71 Since the Amex plaintiffs did not prove net harm on both
sides of the market, they failed to demonstrate anticompetitive effects. 72
In sum, Amex instructs courts that they must take both sides into account
when the two-sided market involves simultaneous transactions, has non-negligible indirect network effects, and can be viewed as a single market dealing
in transactions.
II.

PROBLEMS WITH AMEX

Amex has sparked vigorous debate among antitrust and economics scholars. Some praised the decision for taking contemporary economic theory of

63. Id. at 2281.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2285–86.
66. Id. at 2286.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lerner, Kevin M. Murphy & Lacey L. Plache, Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment
Card Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 580 (2006)).
71. See id. at 2278 (“Accordingly, the two-sided market for credit-card transactions
should be analyzed as a whole.”).
72. Id.
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two-sided markets into account, 73 while others said it “devastates antitrust
law.” 74 This Part outlines two major categories of concerns with the Amex decision. Section II.A discusses problems with how Amex modified antitrust
analysis. Section II.B reveals problems with Amex’s definition of two-sided
markets and, by extension, its applicability beyond payment platforms.
A. Amex’s Application to Antitrust Analysis
Amex requires collapsing two-sided markets into a single market and
proving net anticompetitive harm by taking into account both sides of the
market. For example, if Amex’s no-steering provision benefited customers
more than it harmed merchants, then the provision would not be anticompetitive under Amex. This requirement, which increases the plaintiff’s burden in
the first step of rule of reason analysis, has been controversial among scholars.
This Section explains why collapsing the market and looking at the net effect
creates problems. First, there is no consensus in the economic literature about
the Court’s approach, and antitrust law pre-Amex was already equipped to
handle two-sided markets. Second, the burden Amex places on plaintiffs is too
high and is inconsistent with the goals of antitrust law. Third, United States v.
Sabre’s holding on competition between two-sided and one-sided markets
could further stifle competition if adopted by other courts. 75
1.

Net-Effects Analysis Versus Separate-Effects Analysis

Modern antitrust law relies heavily on economics. 76 Yet Amex did not rely
on settled economic principles. In fact, there is vigorous debate in the economic literature about how to analyze two-sided markets. 77 Currently, the two
leading approaches outlined in the literature are net-effects analysis and separate-effects analysis. 78

73. See, e.g., David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Role of Market Definition in
Assessing Anti-competitive Harm in Ohio v. American Express, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., June
2019, at 19, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/AC
_June_2.pdf [perma.cc/ZE6Q-GLLS]; Evan Chesler & David Korn, Lessons from Amex for Platform Antitrust Litigation, 98 NEB. L. REV. 345 (2019).
74. Tim Wu, Opinion, The Supreme Court Devastates Antitrust Law, N.Y. TIMES (June
26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/opinion/supreme-court-american-express.html
[perma.cc/VN9N-ZXKJ] (cleaned up).
75. 452 F. Supp. 3d 97 (D. Del. 2020), vacated as moot, No. 20-1767, 2020 WL 4915824
(3d Cir. July 20, 2020).
76. E.g., Khan, supra note 12, at 718–22.
77. Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement, 127
YALE L.J. 2142, 2145 (2018) (comparing net- and separate-effects analysis).
78. Id.
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Amex adopted net-effects analysis, 79 an approach advanced by Lapo Filistrucchi. 80 Under this approach, the consumer welfare standard treats consumers on both sides of the market equally. 81 In Amex, this meant that the
harm to merchants could be directly balanced against the benefit to cardholders. 82 Thus, even if Amex’s behavior resulted in cognizable anticompetitive
harm to merchants, there was no violation of the antitrust laws so long as there
was an offsetting benefit to cardholders. Put another way, anticompetitive harm
on one side of the platform would not be actionable if it were outweighed by the
benefits to the other side. 83 Since net-effects analysis involves directly weighing
harms and benefits to each customer group, this approach assumes that each customer group has equal importance when assessing anticompetitive harms.84
By contrast, other scholars advocate for separate-effects analysis, which
requires that each side of the platform be considered separately. 85 Under separate-effects analysis, two-sided platforms are treated as multiple separate but
interrelated markets and cannot be collapsed. 86 If applied to Amex, it would
mean that plaintiffs would only need to show harm to either merchants or
cardholders. In other words, separate-effects analysis allows each group of
consumers on either side of the platform to benefit from competition under
antitrust law. 87
Separate-effects analysis avoids the assumptions upon which net-effects
analysis relies, namely, that each side of the market has equal weight and can
be directly compared. Although these assumptions may hold for platforms
with strong indirect network effects like payment systems, they should not be
applied indiscriminately to two-sided markets for which these assumptions
may not make sense. Collapsing both sides of the platform into one “obscure[s] the underlying economic forces” that drive this relationship 88 and
renders “any coherent economic analysis of the relevant market impossible.” 89
Advocates for the net-effects approach claim that traditional rule of reason analysis, which uses the separate-effects approach, 90 cannot adequately account for anticompetitive harm since it does not explicitly take both sides of

79. Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286–87 (2018).
80. Lapo Filistrucchi, Damien Geradin, Eric van Damme & Pauline Affeldt, Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Practice, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 293, 301–02
(2014).
81. Katz & Sallet, supra note 77, at 2162.
82. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2287.
83. See Katz & Sallet, supra note 77, at 2145–46.
84. Id. at 2145.
85. E.g., id. at 2161–66.
86. See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE
J. ON REGUL. 325, 339–40 (2003).
87. Katz & Sallet, supra note 77, at 2145.
88. Carlton, supra note 19, at 105.
89. Hovenkamp, supra note 52, at 53.
90. Sarin, supra note 20, at 557–58.
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the platform into account. 91 Yet traditional rule of reason analysis would have
sufficiently captured anticompetitive harm even on the facts of Amex. Justice
Breyer’s Amex dissent pointed to the harms that Discover suffered as a result
of Amex’s no-steering provisions. 92 Discover had tried to lower its merchant
fees to encourage adoption, but Amex’s no-steering provisions prevented
merchants from encouraging customers to use Discover over Amex. 93 Since
there was no price difference between the two credit cards from the customer’s
perspective, customers had little incentive to switch to Discover. When Discover’s lower merchant fees did not result in greater adoption, Discover abandoned this strategy and raised its merchant fees to match the other credit card
companies. 94 As a result, merchants uniformly had to pay higher fees. 95 Higher
merchant fees hurt the merchant directly unless the merchant decided to pass
on these costs to its customers. Given that merchants and consumers could be
directly harmed through higher prices, the harm from Amex’s no-steering
provision would have been captured under traditional rule of reason analysis.
That wasn’t the only direct evidence of anticompetitive harm in Amex.
Amex had also increased its merchant fees on twenty different occasions
within five years without increasing its cardholder rewards. 96 Notably, Amex
did not lose any major merchants after these fee increases. 97 Amex’s ability to
keep these merchants after numerous fee increases shows that Amex’s nosteering provision allowed it to exercise market power in a way that resulted
in market inefficiencies. 98 This direct evidence of anticompetitive harm would
have been captured by the traditional rule of reason approach. Thus, Amex
itself demonstrates that traditional rule of reason analysis, which relies on the
separate-effects approach, can adequately capture anticompetitive behavior in
two-sided markets. 99
Amex’s adoption of the net-effects approach also creates problems in the
technology context. Many Big Tech companies have both one-sided and twosided markets, which makes analyzing the market as one unit a challenging undertaking. Even if the assumptions of net-effects analysis apply to payment systems, extending this framework to complex technology platforms goes too far.
91. Jean Tirole, Regulating the Disrupters, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/regulating-the-disrupters-by-jean-tirole-2019-01
[perma.cc/9RCS-QGV7].
92. Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2293–94 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 2304.
94. Id. at 2293–94.
95. See id. at 2294.
96. Id. at 2293.
97. Id.
98. John B. Kirkwood, Antitrust and Two-Sided Platforms: The Failure of American Express, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1805, 1813–14 (2020).
99. Scholars agree with Justice Breyer that the Court could have looked at the market
from the perspective of either the merchant or consumer and performed its typical rule of reason
analysis. See, e.g., Carlton, supra note 19, at 105; Kirkwood, supra note 98, at 1813.
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Amazon is one example of a company with both two-sided and one-sided
platforms. Amazon Marketplace is a two-sided platform because it facilitates
transactions between third-party sellers and customers; by contrast, Amazon’s
business of selling directly to customers is one-sided. Interestingly, Amazon
competes directly with third-party sellers as a participant on its own platform. 100 Collapsing this system into a single market and calculating the net
anticompetitive harm ignores the company’s dual role as both platform and
participant. 101 Moreover, Amazon’s participation in its own marketplace may
result in weaker indirect network effects for the third-party two-sided market. 102 Since Amazon can lower its prices to undercut its competition, competing third-party sellers are less likely to see the benefits of more buyers
joining the platform. 103 This interaction highlights the importance of capturing Amazon’s role as a participant in Amazon Marketplace. 104 Reducing this
complicated relationship into a single market would fail to capture all of the
important market forces at play. 105
Amazon is not an anomaly. Other technology companies follow Amazon’s model of participating in their own platforms. For example, Google promotes its own products over others in its search engine. If the user searches
for a flight, Google can make Google Flights appear at the top of the list of
search results, 106 while competitors like Expedia are demoted within the results. 107 Likewise, the Google search engine promotes its own restaurant listings over Yelp listings 108 and places Google ads at the top of the results page. 109
Similar to the Amazon example, collapsing the Google ecosystem into a single
market would ignore the anticompetitive effect it exerts as a participant on its
own platform. Thus, even if net-effects analysis is correctly applied to payment
systems, it should not apply to complex technology platforms.

100. See Bloodstein, supra note 18, at 224.
101. See id. at 224–25.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Rolfe Winkler & Brody Mullins, How Google Skewed Search Results, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
19, 2015, 7:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-google-skewed-search-results-1426793553
[perma.cc/PTX2-4UAA].
107. Justin Bachman, Expedia Books a Painful Trip Down Google’s Search Results,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2014, 10:41 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0123/expedia-books-a-painful-trip-down-googles-search-results [perma.cc/BP2R-ZHTP].
108. See Lauren Feiner, Yelp Gives Senators Its List of Grievances Against Google in Antitrust Hearing, CNBC (Mar. 10, 2020, 3:27 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/10/yelp-testifiesagainst-google-in-antitrust-senate-hearing.html [perma.cc/22CZ-33BL]; Josh Constine, Leaked
Documents Show How Yelp Thinks It’s Getting Screwed by Google, TECHCRUNCH (July 9, 2014,
6:12 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2014/07/09/yelp-google-anti-trust [perma.cc/7KEC-U8D7].
109. Geoffrey A. Fowler, How Does Google’s Monopoly Hurt You? Try These Searches.,
WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10
/19/google-search-results-monopoly [perma.cc/S5PS-RZ7C].
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Plaintiff’s Burden

Amex places too high a burden on plaintiffs. 110 In traditional rule of reason analysis, anticompetitive and procompetitive effects are weighed only after both parties have a chance to make their case. 111 Amex changed that for
two-sided markets. 112 Under Amex, plaintiffs challenging two-sided markets
must show net anticompetitive harm on both sides of the platform at the first
step of the rule of reason analysis. 113 This raises a few concerns.
First, there are practical challenges that make it difficult for plaintiffs to
prove net anticompetitive harm on both sides of a two-sided platform. 114 Generally, defendants, not plaintiffs, have the best understanding of their own
platforms and pricing structures, as well as of how consumers on either side of
the platform interact. 115 Thus, Amex’s burden imposes a higher cost on plaintiffs than it does on defendants. This cost is even greater for complicated technology platforms that require specialized knowledge to understand their
operations. In contrast, traditional rule of reason analysis requires that defendants bear the burden of proving procompetitive justifications because they best
understand how the challenged conduct results in efficiencies. 116 The analysis
for two-sided platforms should follow a similar principle by placing the burden
on defendants since they typically have the lowest cost of producing evidence. 117
Second, weighing the anticompetitive harm to each side should not take
place in the first step of rule of reason analysis. One of the goals of antitrust
law is to promote competition. 118 Each side of the platform should have the
opportunity to receive protection from anticompetitive harm. 119 Typically,
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are weighed in the final step of rule
of reason analysis. 120 Under Amex, however, the burden of weighing anticompetitive effects for two-sided platforms is instead located at the first step. 121
Since anticompetitive harm to one side could be outweighed up front by the
procompetitive benefits to the other side, the higher initial burden makes it
harder to protect each side from anticompetitive harm.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Hovenkamp Letter, supra note 35, at 2.
See id.
See Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018).
See supra Section I.C.
Katz & Sallet, supra note 77, at 2174.
See id.
Id. at 2172–73.
Id. at 2173.
See supra Section I.A.
Katz & Sallet, supra note 77, at 2173.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.C.
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This high upfront burden on plaintiffs provides an incentive for defendants to claim their platforms are two-sided markets. 122 Although they have
been largely unsuccessful thus far, defendants in lower courts have already begun to claim that they are two-sided or multi-sided markets despite not meeting
Amex’s definition.123 For example, in In re National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Litigation, the NCAA’s expert witness claimed that
universities are multi-sided platforms because of their many constituencies, including student-athletes, alumni, coaches and staff, the institution, and the community. 124 The court rightfully rejected this claim because the NCAA failed to
describe the product, price, or economic interactions between these different
constituencies. 125 Similarly, the In re Delta Dental Antitrust Litigation defendant failed to demonstrate that the dental-insurance market was two-sided. 126
Finally, this burden on plaintiffs is even more concerning in the technology context since it is difficult to show net anticompetitive harm. Many technology companies like Google and Facebook offer their products to users for
free. They would argue that any anticompetitive behavior on the seller side of
the market is offset by these low prices. This would give these companies an
extra defense.
3.

Competition Between Two-Sided and One-Sided Markets

United States v. Sabre Corp. considered whether it is possible to define the
relevant market as including both two-sided and one-sided competitors under
Amex. Even though the case was vacated by the Third Circuit and is therefore

122. Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713, 752 (2019) (“[W]e can expect
an outpouring of defendants emphatically claiming to be two-sided . . . . It will thus become necessary to filter out the pretext.”).
123. See Letter from Tim Wu, Prof., Colum. L. Sch., to Chairman David N. Cicilline and
Ranking Member F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com., & Admin. L. of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 2 (Apr. 25, 2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/submission_from_timothy_wu.pdf [perma.cc/L648-9Z2D] (“Already, companies accused of anticompetitive conduct have begun to seize upon American Express like a talisman, or some kind
of get-out-of-jail-free card issued by the Court. That the case is often willfully misinterpreted is
not the point—it does its damage by its very existence.”).
124. See 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1066 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020),
aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021); see also Ted Tatos,
Relevant Market Definition and Multi-sided Platforms After Ohio v. American Express: Evidence
from Recent NCAA Antitrust Litigation, 10 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 147, 148 (2019).
125. Id. at 150.
126. 484 F. Supp. 3d 627 (N.D. Ill. 2020). The Court rejected Delta Dental’s claim that it was
a two-sided transaction market for three reasons. First, Amex is applicable to rule of reason analysis
and does not preclude a claim of per se illegality. In re Delta Dental Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 3d
at 636. Second, the agreement was horizontal, not vertical like in Amex. Id. at 637. Third, the
platform did not meet the simultaneous-transaction test because dental insurers get paid at a
different time than the patient receives services. Id.
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not precedential, it still provides a useful roadmap for technology defendants
in other circuits. 127
Sabre involved a merger between two companies, Sabre and Farelogix. 128
Sabre makes a global distribution system that connects travel agents and airlines. 129 Farelogix provides software systems only to airlines. 130 Despite recognizing that “Sabre [a]nd Farelogix [v]iew [e]ach [o]ther [a]s [c]ompetitors”
and that “[t]he record reflects competition between” Sabre and Farelogix in
software for airlines, the district court held that the two companies could not
compete in the same relevant market. 131 This was because Sabre was two-sided
while Farelogix was not. 132 To support its holding, the district court cited dicta
from Amex, which noted that “[o]nly other two-sided platforms can compete
with a two-sided platform for transactions.” 133
This decision marked the first time that Amex was applied in a horizontal
merger context. 134 This is notable because Amex was previously thought to
only apply to vertical restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 135 Even
more concerning is the court’s holding that two-sided platforms cannot compete with one-sided platforms in the same relevant market. This could lead to
economically confusing and unintuitive results. In his submission to the
House Judiciary Committee’s 2020 antitrust investigation, Herbert
Hovenkamp observed that “[t]housands of traditional taxicab companies and
drivers who have been injured by Uber, Inc., would be surprised to hear that
Uber and taxicabs cannot be competitors.” 136 The Sabre decision was also
made as a matter of law, meaning that factual questions about the markets
remain “outside the reach of fact finding.” 137

127. United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 97 (D. Del. 2020), vacated as moot, No.
20-1767, 2020 WL 4915824 (3d Cir. July 20, 2020).
128. Id. at 103.
129. Id. at 108.
130. Id. at 112–13.
131. Id. at 117–18; see also Swisher & Boudreault, supra note 19.
132. Sabre, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 136.
133. Id. at 138 (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018)).
134. Joseph M. Miller, Bruce D. Sokler, Shawn N. Skolky & Tinny T. Song, In Application of
American Express to Horizontal Merger Challenge, District Court Allows Merger of Airline Ticket
Platforms, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/application-american-express-to-horizontal-merger-challenge-district-court-allows [perma.cc/B6SA-J5WF].
135. See FTC v. Surescripts, LLC, 424 F. Supp. 3d 92, 103 (D.D.C. 2020); Irving Scher, Ohio
v. American Express Co.: The Supreme Court Addresses Anti-steering, HAUSFELD (Aug. 16,
2018), https://www.hausfeld.com/what-we-think/competition-bulletin/ohio-v-american-express-co-the-supreme-court-addresses-anti-steering [perma.cc/G6UB-Z67B].
136. Hovenkamp Letter, supra note 35, at 4 n.10.
137. Id.; see also Andrew Ewalt, Two Sides to Every Story: Growing Tensions Between Legal Rules
and Economic Realities for Platform Industries, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Aug. 9, 2020), https://
www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/two-sides-to-every-story-growing-tensions-betweenlegal-rules-and-economic-realities-for-platform-industries [perma.cc/5TRK-2V4F] (“US Airways
and Sabre/Farelogix illustrate how, if the first case to apply Amex to a particular business holds
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In addition, Sabre based its decision on misinterpreted dicta from Amex.
The Amex majority’s statement that only other two-sided platforms can compete with a two-sided transaction platform was dicta because neither the case
nor the parties asked the court to decide this point. 138 Further, as Andrew
Ewalt points out, Amex’s statement misreads an article written by Lapo Filistrucchi and cited by the Court. 139 While Filistrucchi’s article did say that
two-sided platforms should be distinguished from other two-sided platforms,
it did not say “that two-sided transaction platforms only compete with other
two-sided platforms.” 140
Soon after Sabre was decided, the DOJ filed a motion to vacate the district
court’s opinion, citing concerns about the case’s effects on competition involving technology platforms. 141 While the Third Circuit did ultimately vacate
the decision, 142 there is still a blueprint for defendants to follow when presenting similar arguments in the future. 143 This could have wide-reaching effects
on antitrust law, especially for technology platforms. Given the prevalence of twosided platforms in the technology sector, it would be dangerous to say that twosided platforms cannot be in the same relevant market as one-sided businesses.
B. Amex’s Characterization of Two-Sided Markets
Just as there is a lack of consensus on how to analyze two-sided markets,
there is also no consensus on how to define them. 144 Instead of relying on an

as a matter of law that the business operates a two-sided transaction platform, other courts may
be heavily influenced, or even bound, by that determination, however uncomfortable the result.”).
138. Ewalt, supra note 137.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Swisher & Boudreault, supra note 19.
142. United States v. Sabre Corp., No. 20-1767, 2020 WL 4915824 (3d Cir. July 20, 2020)
(vacating without expressing opinion on the merits due to Sabre mooting the case pending appeal). Just days after the district court approved the merger between Sabre and Farelogix, the
United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) blocked it. Subsequently, the
companies abandoned the merger deal. The DOJ took the CMA’s decision as evidence that the
merger was anticompetitive and brought the motion to vacate. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Just., Statement from Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim on Sabre and Farelogix Decision to Abandon Merger (May 1, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-sabre-and-farelogix-decision-abandon [perma.cc/LX67-AB5J].
143. Swisher & Boudreault, supra note 19.
144. Under Rochet and Tirole’s definition, a market is two-sided if the volume of transactions would be affected by a price increase to one side of the market and an equally offsetting
price decrease to the other side of the market. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided
Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645, 646 (2006). Another definition, advanced by
Katz and Sallet, says that a firm is multisided when cross-platform network effects occur in at
least one direction, the firm facilitates interactions between two or more groups of users, and the
firm has market power over the groups and can set distinct prices for each group. Katz & Sallet,
supra note 77, at 2150.
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economist’s definition, the Amex majority formulated its own. 145 Recognizing
that there are many platforms that exhibit indirect network effects, the Amex
Court defined two-sided markets as “transaction platforms” that deal in simultaneous transactions and have non-negligible indirect network effects. 146
While other scholars have critiqued Amex’s definition of two-sided markets,
this Section contributes novel analysis of post-Amex cases to supplement these
critiques and demonstrate how lower courts’ interpretations of Amex raises
enforcement concerns for Big Tech platforms.
1.

Simultaneous-Transaction Requirement

Amex limited its holding to platforms where the two customer groups interact through transactions that occur at the same time for both groups.147
This simultaneous-transaction requirement suffers from a number of defects.
The requirement is unsupported by antitrust precedents or the economic literature. 148 The Court justified the addition of this requirement by explaining
that two-sided transaction platforms “exhibit more pronounced indirect network effects” and have “interconnected pricing and demand.” 149 Yet the majority opinion failed to explain why transaction platforms tend to have
stronger indirect network effects than other two-sided platforms. 150
Some scholars contend that the simultaneous-transaction requirement
prevents Amex from being applied too broadly. 151 They view Amex’s additional requirement as a safeguard that ensures courts will not treat companies
like Google and Facebook as two-sided platforms. 152 But although Amex’s
holding was narrower than the Second Circuit’s, which omitted the simultaneous-transaction requirement, 153 Amex’s definition of two-sided markets is
still broader than that of most economists. 154 In fact, Justice Breyer’s dissent

145. Oscar Borgogno & Giuseppe Colangelo, Antitrust Analysis of Two-Sided Platforms
After AmEx: A Transatlantic View 6 (Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Tech. L.F., Working Paper
No. 41, 2019), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/borgogno_colangelo_wp41.pdf [perma.cc/48AQ-4S8C].
146. See supra Section I.C.
147. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280, 2286–87 (2018).
148. Id. at 2298 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Hovenkamp, supra note 52, at 81–82.
149. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2286.
150. Richard M. Brunell, Ohio v. Amex: Not So Bad After All?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2018, at
16, 17 [perma.cc/7Y5L-DTUT].
151. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 18, at 123; ROGER ALFORD, AM. ANTITRUST INST., HOW TO
APPROACH MARKET DEFINITION AFTER OHIO V. AMERICAN EXPRESS 3 (2020), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/alford.pdf [perma.cc/2KKT-ECVP].
152. Borgogno & Colangelo, supra note 145, at 36; see also Wu, supra note 18, at 124;
ALFORD, supra note 151, at 3.
153. Wu, supra note 18, at 123. Interestingly, Tim Wu also observed that the Court’s narrowing of Amex via the simultaneous-transaction requirement signals its reticence to overrule
past cases dealing with two-sided markets. Id. at 124.
154. Borgogno & Colangelo, supra note 145, at 6.
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argued that the majority’s formulation was overbroad. 155 The dissent contended that each element of the majority’s “two-sided transaction platform”
definition is in fact commonplace. 156 Many businesses—including farmers
markets, travel agencies, and internet retailers—connect two groups of customers to each other in simultaneous transactions and have indirect network
effects. 157 Thus, it is more than plausible that Amex’s definition of two-sided
markets is broad enough to include Big Tech platforms.
In addition to being overly broad, the simultaneous-transaction requirement is also susceptible to framing. First, the simultaneity of the transaction
can easily be manipulated. For example, when someone makes a search query
in Google, there are no obvious simultaneous transactions between this user
and an advertiser. 158 If Google charged its advertisers upfront, similar to newspaper or television advertisements, this would be an accurate assessment. But
if Google charged the advertiser at the moment the user clicked on the search
result, then this assessment would be inaccurate because such a scheme would
satisfy the simultaneity requirement. 159
Uber is another example of the simultaneous-transaction requirement’s
susceptibility to framing. Uber used to charge customers after their ride was
complete, calculating the price based on the actual time and distance traveled. 160 Since the customer hailed the ride and paid at different times, Uber
transactions would not meet the simultaneity requirement. Later, Uber began
charging its customers when they requested a driver instead of after the ride. 161
Under Amex, this seemingly small design change classifies this transaction as
simultaneous since payment is made at the same time as the ride request.
Thus, companies only have to change when money is exchanged in order to
satisfy simultaneity. Google and Uber illustrate the ease with which technology companies can manipulate the simultaneity of their transactions without
changing the competitive effect of their actions.
The simultaneity requirement can also produce unintuitive results. For
example, Amazon might seem like a paradigmatic two-sided transaction platform, 162 but purchases fulfilled by Amazon itself do not meet the simultaneity
requirement. This is because Amazon’s suppliers sell products to Amazon

155. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2298–99 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156. See id.
157. Id. at 2299.
158. See ELEANOR M. FOX & DANIEL A. CRANE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON U.S.
ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 698 (4th ed. 2020).
159. Id.
160. Alison Griswold, Uber Is Going Back in Time to Prove Its Drivers Aren’t Employees,
QUARTZ (Jan. 20, 2020), https://qz.com/1784804/uber-drops-upfront-pricing-to-prove-driversare-contractors [perma.cc/93VN-9TAQ] (“Price estimates were the norm on Uber until the
company quietly introduced upfront pricing in 2016.”).
161. Id.
162. Bloodstein, supra note 18, at 221.
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long before the user purchases it. 163 Thus, the sale spans two distinct transactions that do not occur simultaneously. By contrast, transactions with thirdparty Amazon Marketplace sellers meet the simultaneity requirement since
the sellers and users transact directly and simultaneously on the Amazon platform. 164 Although there is little difference between buying a product from a
third-party Marketplace seller and buying one directly from Amazon from the
shopper’s perspective, the two transactions come out differently under Amex.
Another problem with Amex’s simultaneous-transaction requirement is
that it is sometimes difficult to define the relevant transaction. Returning to
the Uber example, the “transaction” took place when the customer requested
and simultaneously paid for the ride. But the transaction could just as easily
be framed as “occurring” upon completion of the ride; since the customer paid
for transportation to a particular destination, the transaction is concluded
only when she receives the service she paid for. This framing affects whether
the transaction is considered simultaneous. If the transaction “occurs” upon
completion, Uber’s upfront pricing scheme would not be simultaneous while the
post-ride pricing scheme would be. There is little guidance from Amex about
what constitutes a transaction, 165 creating uncertainty about whether a scheme
like Uber’s would qualify. This could lead to an increase of technology defendants intentionally shifting what constitutes a “transaction” in their business. 166
Because of Amex’s lack of guidance, lower courts have treated the simultaneous-transaction requirement inconsistently, potentially opening the door
to a broader application that would encompass Big Tech platforms. In another
case involving Sabre, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., the Second
Circuit considered a “global distribution system” that allows travel agents to
book flights for their customers. 167 When an agent books a flight on Sabre’s
platform, Sabre collects a booking fee from the airline and gives the agent an
incentive payment once the agent has met the threshold number of bookings. 168 Sabre argued that its platform was a two-sided transaction platform
under Amex, with travel agents on one side and airlines on the other. 169 The
court agreed, citing all of Amex’s elements, including indirect network effects,
simultaneous transactions, and a single market of transactions. 170
While the court correctly referenced Amex’s formal elements, this outcome is nonetheless inconsistent with Amex because it misinterprets the simultaneity requirement. When the travel agent makes the booking, the airline
pays Sabre, but the travel agency only receives an incentive payment after

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 220.
See id. at 220–21.
See Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018).
See Khan, supra note 12, at 716.
938 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2019).
U.S. Airways, 938 F.3d at 50.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 57–59.
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reaching a certain booking threshold. 171 Since there is no transfer of money
between airlines and agents until the threshold is met, this scheme does not
actually satisfy the simultaneity requirement. U.S. Airways’ incorrect holding
exemplifies the confusion of lower courts attempting to apply Amex’s simultaneous-transaction requirement.
Other lower courts seem to ignore the simultaneous-transaction requirement altogether. In Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., the Seventh Circuit
found the “Interconnect,” a clearinghouse for television providers to pool advertising resources, to be a two-sided market because of the indirect network
effects between advertisers and retail customers. 172 It explained that advertisers benefit when more television providers—and thus, more retail customers—participate in the market. 173 Significantly, it did not mention the
simultaneous-transaction requirement in its discussion. Coupled with its ambiguity, the simultaneous-transaction requirement’s uneven treatment by
lower courts signals that some courts will apply Amex too broadly, especially
in the technology context. Lower courts’ confusion thus far means that technology defendants can capitalize on this confusion for their own benefit.
Finally, Amex’s simultaneous-transaction requirement is problematic in
that it serves as a poor proxy for platforms with strong indirect network effects, like payment systems. 174 The Court relied on the assumption that transaction platforms were generally more likely to have strong indirect network
effects, 175 which is not necessarily true. Although payment systems are unique
for their strong indirect network effects, there are nontransaction platforms
with strong indirect network effects and transaction platforms with weaker
indirect network effects. 176 For example, Amazon Marketplace is a transaction
platform with weak indirect network effects. 177 Amazon shoppers are unlikely
to care how many sellers there are on Amazon as long as they can buy the
product they seek, making the platform closer to a newspaper than a payment
system under Amex. 178 In sum, the simultaneous-transaction requirement is
problematic for several reasons: it is overbroad, ambiguous, and a poor proxy
for the strength of indirect network effects.

171. Id. at 50.
172. 951 F.3d 429, 438–39 (7th Cir. 2020).
173. Viamedia, 951 F.3d at 439.
174. See Joshua D. Wright & John M. Yun, Ohio v. American Express: Implications for Nontransaction Multisided Platforms, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., June 2019, at 29, 32–34, https://
www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/AC_June_2.pdf [perma
.cc/23EW-ZFJG].
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See id.
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Strength of Indirect Network Effects

Amex’s second requirement—that the platform has non-negligible indirect network effects—also suffers from a lack of clarity that could extend Amex
to Big Tech. Although Amex used payment systems and newspapers as examples of strong and weak indirect network effects, respectively, 179 the Court did
not provide guidance on where to draw the line for anything in between. 180
Even in the economic literature, there is no bright-line rule that establishes
how strong a platform’s indirect network effects must be in order to qualify as
two-sided. 181 This may be why the Court turned to a seemingly more concrete
test like the simultaneous-transaction requirement. This lack of a bright-line
rule opens the door for defendants to falsely claim that their platforms have
strong indirect network effects and should be treated as two-sided markets.
In some cases, defendants have argued that there are strong indirect network effects because consumers benefit from lower prices. In Delta Dental,
the umbrella insurance company pointed to the mutual benefits that member
companies and patients enjoy as evidence of strong indirect network effects. 182 It argued that member companies benefited from having more patients, and patients likewise benefited from lower premiums when more
companies joined Delta Dental. 183 Similarly, in Viamedia, the court determined that the indirect network effects of the “Interconnect” were strong
enough for Comcast’s advertising clearinghouse to be considered twosided. 184 It reasoned that the clearinghouse’s indirect network effects were
strong because advertisers benefit from having more consumers on the platform, and consumers benefit because having more advertisers allows Comcast
to subsidize prices. 185
Such reasoning contradicts well-established knowledge about two-sidedness. Drawing the line between strong and weak indirect network effects—
and, by extension, determining two-sidedness—cannot depend solely on
companies’ benevolence in passing discounts on to customers. For example,
as Amex itself recognized, newspapers are the quintessential example of platforms with negligible indirect network effects. 186 Newspapers connect advertisers with readers, and readers are generally indifferent as to how many

179. Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018).
180. Will Rinehart & Pranjal Drall, Platform Competition and the Implications of Amex,
AM. ACTION F.: COMMENTS FOR THE REC. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.americanactionforum.org/comments-for-record/platform-competition-and-the-implications-of-amex [perma.cc
/ZRU5-R4RJ].
181. Borgogno & Colangelo, supra note 145, at 6.
182. In re Delta Dental Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 3d 627, 637 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
183. Id.
184. See Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 439 (7th Cir. 2020).
185. Id.
186. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018).
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advertisers take out ads. 187 Amex would have rejected the claim that a newspaper has strong indirect network effects because having more advertisers enables the newspaper to lower its prices for subscribers. 188 Similar to
newspapers, the customers in Delta Dental and Viamedia would likely be indifferent to the number of insurers or advertisers on the platform, even if they
were to get lower premiums or prices. Despite this, Viamedia implied that
Comcast’s platform had strong enough indirect network effects to be twosided, and only for other reasons did Delta Dental hold that the platform was
one-sided. 189 This confusion in the lower courts demonstrates the problems
that come with extending Amex beyond payment systems.
Despite being analytically incorrect, these arguments could provide a
roadmap for future technology defendants because of confusion in the lower
courts. As an example, Google could argue that its platform has strong indirect network effects because the more advertisers it accepts, the more easily it
can keep consumer prices at zero. This argument ignores the fact that most
Google users are indifferent to how many advertisers Google has on its platform, so long as their queries are correctly answered. Even though this reasoning is technically incorrect, confusion in the lower courts means that Big
Tech defendants might eventually succeed with such an argument. As more
lower courts begin to grapple with Amex, this is one area of potential inconsistency that deserves further scrutiny.
In conclusion, Amex’s definition of two-sided markets is overbroad, ambiguous, and susceptible to manipulation by technology companies and other
antitrust defendants. These flaws open the possibility of lower courts’ extending Amex’s protections to Big Tech.
III. SOLUTIONS
The Court’s analysis in Amex is problematic, both because of how it modifies antitrust analysis and because of its potential applications beyond payment systems. In response, Part III proposes a two-part legislative solution to
limit Amex’s application to future cases. Section III.A remedies issues raised
by Amex’s tenuous formulation with a novel compromise solution: replacing
the simultaneous-transaction requirement with narrow categories of twosided markets. Section III.B proposes additional legislation to explicitly override Sabre, which extended Amex in mistaken and dangerous ways. Finally,
Section III.C contends that legislative solutions are appropriate to remedy
problems in judge-made antitrust law.

187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Viamedia, 951 F.3d at 439; see In re Delta Dental Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 3d 627,
637 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
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A. Replacing the Simultaneous-Transaction Requirement with Narrow
Categories of Two-Sided Markets
This Section proposes legislation that would replace the simultaneoustransaction requirement with enumerated categories of two-sided markets.
Even if Amex’s net-effects analysis is the better approach for some platforms
like payment systems, it should only apply to narrow categories of platforms.
Net-effects analysis assumes that one can directly weigh the harms and benefits to each customer group directly. 190 Recognizing that it might not be possible
to directly weigh harms and benefits for all types of two-sided markets, the
Amex majority limited its holding only to simultaneous-transaction platforms. 191 However, the simultaneous-transaction requirement is overbroad and
prone to manipulation. 192 Recognizing this requirement as a proxy for strong
indirect network effects does not solve the problem because there is no clear
line delineating strong and weak indirect network effects in antitrust law. 193
Because of its flaws, legislators, scholars, and practitioners alike have advocated for overturning or narrowing Amex. 194 However, only the Supreme
Court has the authority to overturn its own precedent and it is unlikely that
the Court would overturn a case decided as recently as 2018. Alternatively,
lower courts could limit Amex’s reach by interpreting it narrowly. Courts
could achieve this by noting that the simultaneous-transaction requirement is
simply trying to capture markets like payment systems with strong indirect
network effects. They could also reason that, given the unique nature of payment systems, Amex should be limited to its facts. 195
Yet curbing Amex in the lower courts brings its own set of challenges. As
this Note demonstrates, lower courts have not applied Amex uniformly. 196
They have ignored aspects of the Amex formulation and, at times, even misapplied Amex outright. 197 A judicial approach would take years to play out in
the lower courts, with many hiccups along the way. Meanwhile, our ever-increasing reliance on technology, accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic,
means that Big Tech companies will continue to solidify their positions of
power in the global economy. 198
190. See Katz & Sallet, supra note 77, at 2162.
191. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2286.
192. See supra Section II.B.1.
193. See, e.g., Rinehart & Drall, supra note 180.
194. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 20; MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM.
& ADMIN. L. OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION
IN DIGITAL MARKETS 398–99 (Comm. Print 2020) [hereinafter ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORT].
195. See Borgogno & Colangelo, supra note 145, at 6.
196. See supra Part II.
197. See supra Part II.
198. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Jack Nicas, Steve Lohr & Mike Isaac, Big Tech Could Emerge
from Coronavirus Crisis Stronger than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-facebook-amazon-youtube.html [perma.cc/ZKN8-DV39].
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Given the challenges of limiting Amex judicially, the House Judiciary
Committee called for legislative change in its recent report on Big Tech and
antitrust. 199 The report recommended overriding Amex by crafting legislation
that clarifies that “cases involving platforms do not require plaintiffs to establish harm to both sets of customers.”200 Even more recently, Senator
Klobuchar proposed an expansive antitrust reform bill with similar language
to override Amex. 201 These recent developments signal political desire to
change antitrust laws. However, Senator Klobuchar’s bill would fundamentally change many aspects of antitrust law unrelated to platforms, and it remains unclear how much support such a wide-reaching bill will garner. 202
In light of these potential political challenges, combined with continued
disagreement on how to analyze two-sided markets, this Note proposes a
compromise solution: legislatively replacing the simultaneous-transaction requirement with enumerated categories of two-sided markets. Accounting for
the vigorous debate on whether to employ the net-effects versus separate-effects approaches, this solution would restrict net-effects analysis only to the
platforms where it makes the most sense—those with strong indirect network
effects. For example, legislators could statutorily define two-sided markets as
platforms that belong to specifically enumerated categories, including payment systems. The list would initially include payment systems since these are
well understood to have strong indirect network effects. 203 As economists
reach a consensus about the two-sidedness of other platforms, they too could
be added to the list.
This solution avoids overbreadth by starting with a narrow statutory definition that can expand as economic understanding evolves. Such an approach
would ensure that plaintiffs are not required to prove net anticompetitive
harm for novel technology platforms that economists have not yet studied.
Given Amex’s high upfront burden on plaintiffs, 204 it is better to err on the
side of being too narrow than being too broad.
A narrow approach would also solve Amex’s susceptibility to framing and
confusion in the lower courts. Instead of relying on the simultaneous-trans-

199. See ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 194, at 398–99.
200. Id. at 399.
201. Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, S. 225, 117th Cong.
§ 9 (2021) (“[S]uch violation does not require finding . . . that when a defendant operates a
multi-sided platform business, the conduct of the defendant presents an appreciable risk of
harming competition on one more than 1 side of the multi-sided platform.”).
202. Hamilton & Tilley, supra note 9; Ryan Tracy, Amazon Is the Target of Small-Business
Antitrust Campaign, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2021, 8:17 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/merchantgroups-target-amazon-in-new-political-campaign-11617701401 [perma.cc/M43E-V9QL] (“Competition policy and antitrust reform is the likeliest potential legislation affecting the tech sector
that this Congress could pass, and yet I still think it’s below 50% odds . . . . It’s a tall order for any
advocates and groups to compel Congress to actually enact material changes to the statute.”).
203. See Borgogno & Colangelo, supra note 145, at 6 & n.14.
204. See supra Section II.A.2.
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action requirement, which can be easily manipulated by technology platforms, 205 Amex would only apply to a set of clearly defined categories. This
clarity is important, as it will reduce frivolous arguments by defendants like
those in Delta Dental and the NCAA antitrust litigation. 206 This solution also
addresses concerns about judicial expertise. 207 It would ensure that judges do
not have to grapple with increasingly difficult economic questions related to
complicated technology platforms. Instead, decisions about two-sidedness
would shift to Congress, which has the ability to consult economic and technical experts throughout its deliberations. Since Congress and economists
would do the difficult work of defining two-sidedness, this solution would relieve judges from their present obligations of finding the blurry line between
strong and weak indirect network effects and applying the tenuous simultaneous-transaction requirement. Other countries have acknowledged these
economic complexities by enacting laws tailored to regulating payment platforms. 208 It is time for the United States to follow suit.
B. Clarifying the Relationship Between One- and Two-Sided Markets
Section III.A proposed a compromise solution to Amex that takes into
account opposing economic views of two-sided markets. However, that solution only solves problems with Amex’s framework and does not address the
issues that Sabre created. Sabre incorrectly extended Amex’s holding beyond
vertical restraints and held that two-sided markets could not exist in the same
relevant market as one-sided markets. 209 In effect, Sabre’s holding meant that
two-sided technology platforms could only be successfully challenged by
other two-sided platforms under antitrust law. This mistaken and dangerous
holding has spurred the House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee to advocate
for a legislative clarification that would ensure Sabre does not repeat itself in
the lower courts. 210 This Section joins them in advocating for a legislative
override of Sabre to supplement the compromise solution in Section III.A.
From the economic and legal perspectives alike, Sabre’s holding is utterly
incoherent. 211 Sabre held that Farelogix and Sabre could not compete within

205. See supra Section II.B.1.
206. See supra Section II.A.2.
207. See, e.g., RANDY M. STUTZ, AM. ANTITRUST INST., WE’VE SEEN ENOUGH: IT IS TIME
TO ABANDON AMEX AND START OVER ON TWO-SIDED MARKETS 5 (2020), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Amex-Commentary-4.21.20-Final.pdf [perma.cc
/BS84-RYZP]; Khan, supra note 12, at 758–59, 765; JESSE LEIGH MANIFF & YING LEI TOH, FED.
RSRV. BANK OF KAN. CITY, STILL ON TRIAL? THE COURT’S USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN THE
AMERICAN EXPRESS CASE (2020), https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/7582/psrb20manifftoh0401.pdf [perma.cc/AS3G-2ERD].
208. Maniff & Toh, supra note 207.
209. See supra Section II.A.3.
210. See, e.g., ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 194, at 399.
211. See Steven C. Salop, Dominant Digital Platforms: Is Antitrust Up to the Task?, 130 YALE
L.J.F. 563, 584–85 (2021) (“[T]his . . . defective approach . . . would lead to ludicrous results.”).
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the same relevant market because Sabre was a two-sided platform and Farelogix was not. 212 The court based its holding on dicta from Amex that misinterpreted a single source—hardly representative of the economic literature at
large. 213 Since antitrust law relies heavily on market definition, 214 the Sabre
court’s finding that Sabre and Farelogix were not participants in the same relevant market insulated their merger from antitrust oversight. 215 Michael Katz
and Douglas Melamed have observed that Sabre’s holding “runs directly
counter to the purpose of defining a relevant market, which is to identify the
sources of competition faced by the firm under consideration.”216 Indeed, in
Sabre itself, the court did not factor into its analysis that the parties considered
themselves competitors. 217
Not only is Sabre inconsistent with antitrust doctrine, but it also risks
providing far too much protection for technology defendants. 218 For example,
under Sabre, Uber could not possibly be in the same relevant market as taxi
companies since taxi companies only operate on one side of the market and
Uber is considered two-sided. 219 Similarly, under Sabre, Amazon Marketplace
could not be in the same relevant market as traditional retailers like Target.
Unlike Amazon Marketplace, which is two-sided because it facilitates transactions between third-party sellers and customers through its platform, Target
is one-sided because it deals directly with customers. Since rule of reason analysis only considers harm to competitors that are in the same relevant market,
Sabre’s rationale would prevent taxis from suing Uber, or Target from suing
Amazon Marketplace, for anticompetitive conduct. Yet we intuitively recognize Uber and taxis, and Target and Amazon, as competitors. If other courts
adopt Sabre’s confused reasoning, two-sided technology platforms may escape antitrust liability to their one-sided competitors.
Given Sabre’s implications for technology platforms, it must be overridden. This is best accomplished through legislation. Specifically, this Note calls
for statutory language that explicitly asserts that multi-sided platforms can
compete in the same relevant market as one-sided firms. This legislation is
necessary because even though the Third Circuit later vacated Sabre, it did not
reverse it. 220 So, while Sabre is not technically precedential, its reasoning has
not been affirmatively rejected and thus provides defendants with a tempting
blueprint to raise in other courts. 221

212. United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d. 97, 136–37 (D. Del. 2020), vacated as
moot, No. 20-1767, 2020 WL 4915824 (3d Cir. July 20, 2020).
213. Id. at 138; Ewalt, supra note 137.
214. See supra Section I.B.
215. Sabre, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 136–37.
216. Katz & Melamed, supra note 22, at 2102.
217. Sabre, 452 F. Supp. 3d. at 117–18.
218. See Hovenkamp Letter, supra note 35, at 3–4.
219. Id. at 3 n.10.
220. United States v. Sabre Corp., No. 20-1767, 2020 WL 4915824 (3d Cir. July 20, 2020).
221. See Swisher & Boudreault, supra note 19.
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Further, clarifying that Sabre was decided incorrectly is best left to Congress rather than the courts. With the recent bipartisan support for antitrust
reform and broad agreement regarding Sabre’s flaws, a legislative fix would
likely be faster and clearer than going through the courts. Especially with the
high burden that Amex places on plaintiffs, 222 awaiting judicial self-correction
poses considerable risks. It would give more time for technology platforms to
become even more dominant in our economy. Thus, a legislative clarification
specifying that one-sided and two-sided markets can compete in the same relevant market, together with the compromise solution from Section III.A, will
go a long way toward curbing Amex’s damage.
C. Legislative Solutions Are Consistent with the Intent of the Sherman Act
This Note’s proposed legislative solutions align with Sherman Act’s intent
because they would bring the law more in line with antitrust’s original goals.
Scholars may argue that legislative narrowing of Amex would take power away
from the courts, in violation of Congress’s intent when drafting the Sherman
Act. It is true that, with its broad statutory language, the Act is widely viewed
as a congressional delegation to the courts. 223 However, the Sherman Act was
also intended to prevent monopolies from forming and to allow small businesses to compete in a fair market. 224
Under the Chicago School, current antitrust law has strayed from both
the language and the intent of the antitrust statutes. 225 Antitrust law has become far less interventionist than the drafters of the Sherman Act would have
intended. 226 Amex is a prime example of this. Before Amex, the rule of reason
already discouraged antitrust enforcement through a high upfront burden on
plaintiffs. 227 Amex made that burden on plaintiffs even higher, furthering this
trend towards non-interventionism. 228 In addition, Amex did not follow antitrust law’s adherence to a cautious, fact-based, common law-like approach. 229
Instead, it “prescribed broad, new principles” based on controversial and
evolving economic scholarship. 230 Thus, even if the Sherman Act was intended

222. See supra Section II.A.2.
223. Crane, supra note 38, at 1205–06.
224. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 909 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Sherman Act seeks to maintain a marketplace free of anticompetitive practices, in particular those enforced by agreement among private firms.”).
225. Crane, supra note 38, at 1207.
226. Id. at 1212–13 (“[O]ver antitrust law’s 130-year history, the courts have consistently
deviated from text and purpose in a single direction—toward reading down the antitrust statutes
in favor of business interests and against populist anti-bigness sentiment.” (footnote omitted)).
227. See supra Section II.A.2.
228. See supra Section I.B.
229. Katz & Melamed, supra note 22, at 2085; see also Douglas Melamed, The American
Express Case: Back to the Future, 18 COLO. TECH. L.J. 1, 18 (2020).
230. Katz & Melamed, supra note 22, at 2106.
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as a broad delegation to courts, a legislative solution that remedies Amex
would only serve antitrust law’s original goals.
Further, Congress has previously intervened when courts strayed too far
from its intent with antitrust laws. For example, Congress passed the McCarran–Ferguson Act in 1945 after the Supreme Court’s United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Association decision. 231 South-Eastern Underwriters
held that the Commerce Clause permitted federal regulation for the insurance
industry. 232 Since the insurance industry was subject to federal laws, it was also
subject to the Sherman Act. 233 This decision “precipitated widespread controversy and dismay,” 234 leading to the passage of the McCarran–Ferguson Act.
The Act exempted the insurance industry from the antitrust statutes, including the Sherman Act. 235
Another example is the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, which Congress
passed after a lower court held the NFL’s attempt to pool the television broadcasting rights of its member teams illegal under the Sherman Act. 236 In response, Congress passed the Sports Broadcasting Act, which established an
antitrust exemption for professional sports leagues. 237
In sum, courts’ interpretations of antitrust laws have departed from the
Sherman Act’s original goals. Historically, Congress has pushed back against
court decisions with which it disagreed through new legislation. Thus, if Congress deems Amex to be in conflict with the goals of antitrust law, a legislative
solution is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
As this Note’s analysis of Amex’s progeny has demonstrated, Amex’s formulation is overbroad, prone to framing, and insufficiently based on current
economic understanding. Inconsistent application of Amex by the lower courts
opens the door for Big Tech to exploit lower courts’ confusion to their advantage. Given antitrust law’s limited power over Big Tech, Amex’s additional
protections for technology companies must be curbed. This Note’s two-part
legislative solution promotes clarity and consistency in the courts and contributes to the broader effort to rein in Big Tech’s growing power over our society.
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